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Why do ﬁrms decide to cross-list? The theoretical model posited by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) shows that if there are
two types of ﬁrms, one of which is more advanced and hence with lower information costs, and has to signal this, cross-listing
can be an important signalling mechanism. It can reduce the importance of country-speciﬁc institutional quality at home
(speciﬁcally, with respect to formal institutions such as investor protection) and enable ﬁrms to overcome limitations of
country-level institutions by leveraging their ﬁrm-level governance quality (Doidge et al., 2007).1 This has speciﬁc implications
for ﬁrms based in emerging market economies that generally have both capital market imperfections and weak investor protec-
tion, and may be associated with adverse selection in developed and global capital markets (Herrmann et al., 2015).
The international ﬁnance approach to this question focuses narrowly on cost of capital advantages (Stulz, 1999), that may then
be reﬂected in higher ﬁrm valuation (Karolyi, 1998). The limited engagement of the international business (IB) literature with the
cross-listing phenomenon focuses on the advantages associated with “bonding” with institutions in a different context, especially
where ﬁrms from relatively weak institutional contexts decide to cross-list in relatively strong institutional contexts (Peng et al.,three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and guidance.
phasis on the cross-listing of foreign ﬁrms on the US stock market, indicating the strong signalling effect asso-
le Alexander et al. (1988), and the literature which follows their work). Pagano et al. (2001), for example, ﬁnd
s, with better investor protection and institutional quality, and hence their attraction for cross-listing in the US.
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266 Y. Temouri et al. / Journal of International Management 22 (2016) 265–2792009). To the best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to incorporate the international ﬁnance and IB approaches to
cross-listing by carefully distinguishing between the signalling and bonding attributes of the phenomenon.
We argue that the real options framework is able to anchor the motivation and ability of ﬁrms to attain and retain a cross-
listing, and also facilitate a clear distinction between signalling and bonding. It is now well understood that the real options
framework,2 offers invaluable insights into how ﬁrms “design operational solutions to market frictions” (Mahoney and Qian,
2013; pp. 1024), where market frictions include factors such as informational opacity and institutional weakness. The ﬁrst and
main contribution of this paper, therefore, is to develop a strategic and integrated narrative concerning the motivations and ability
to cross-list, and beneﬁts associated with signalling and bonding by leveraging this framework.
This narrative provides the basis for our hypotheses which we test using ﬁrm level data from four emerging market economies
that are large and economically important. Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa are part of the BRICS and MINT groups of countries,
while Poland is a major former socialist economy at the heart of new Europe. These countries are representative geographically,
and illustrative of the development paths of their region. At the same time, they offer signiﬁcantly different dimensions of
governance.
Our choice of countries also extends our analysis to encompass the literature on emerging market ﬁrms and the development
of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs), reﬂecting our second contribution. Initial work in this area explained the
existence of EMNEs by “country speciﬁc advantages” (CSAs) such as economies of scale on account of large domestic markets
(Ramamurti and Singh, 2009). More recently, it has been argued that in order to internationalise, emerging market ﬁrms may
need complementary ﬁrm speciﬁc advantages (FSAs), in the form of higher proﬁtability and internal ﬁnancial resources
(Bhaumik et al., 2010, 2015a,b). However, with very few exceptions (Stulz, 1999; Peng and Su, 2014), little has been said
about the rationale for capital market based internationalisation via cross-listing, and how this form of internationalisation can
help in turn the internationalisation of emerging market ﬁrms. We therefore explore how cross-listing can amplify the combina-
tions of FSA and CSA available to emerging market ﬁrms.
Finally, the real options framework speaks to the well documented corporate governance challenges faced by emerging
markets ﬁrms. In the face of certain institutional and ﬁnancial voids, successful ﬁrms in emerging markets develop certain internal
capital and labour market solutions that have adverse implications for governance quality within ﬁrms (Khanna and Palepu,
2000a; Young et al., 2008; Globerman et al., 2011). This has been recognised in the IB literature (Bhaumik et al., 2010), and
our paper further integrates corporate governance of emerging market ﬁrms into the narrative concerning their
internationalisation.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature on cross-listing and derive our hypotheses using the real options
framework. Next, we explain our multistage empirical research design and describe our data sample and variables. We then pres-
ent our results. This is followed by a conclusion where we discuss the implications of our ﬁndings with regards to advancing the
literature on cross-listing by emerging market ﬁrms and outline limitations of this paper which may offer avenues for future
research.2. Literature review on cross-listing
Much of the literature on cross-listing is focused on market reactions (Karolyi, 1998). It focuses on ﬁrms from various
countries that seek to obtain cross-listing in New York, and generally ﬁnds a positive relationship between cross-listing and
share prices, both in the short and long term (Lang et al., 2006; Roosenboom and Van Dijk, 2009; Miller, 1999). Capital market
based globalisation can reduce the cost of capital because of greater ability of international investors to diversify away non-
systematic risk (Stulz, 1999). Furthermore, cross-listing provides more information to the ﬁrm, in part generated through com-
ment from external analysts (Herrmann et al., 2015), and in part through the market view to its opportunities (Foucault and
Gehrig, 2008). This, in turn, enables them to make better investment decisions.
However, there is also a recognition about the signalling effects of cross-listing, and the beneﬁts associated with the change in
perception about a ﬁrm's corporate governance quality that cross-listing may trigger (Doidge et al., 2007; Abdallah and Goergen,
2008; Peng and Su, 2014). Speciﬁcally, if informationally opaque ﬁrms are generally not well governed then it becomes difﬁcult
for a single ﬁrm to prove that it is better governed than its competitors. This can result in adverse selection problems for investors
(Akerlof, 1970), and consequently market failures that shut even relatively well governed ﬁrms out of the capital market.
Signalling in this context is an act that can change the perception of the investors about the governance quality of the company,
as they can distinguish between “good” and “bad” ﬁrms (Spence, 1973).
The more recent literature on cross-listing has extended the discussion about signalling – which is largely a response to prob-
lems of informational asymmetry or opacity – to encompass the related issue of institutional legitimacy. Bell et al. (2012) and
Peng and Su (2014) argue that cross-listing may pave the way for greater legitimacy for emerging market ﬁrms, more by way
of “reputation bonding based on informal institutions” than by way of the formal institutions. This perspective is consistent
with the argument that a number of emerging market ﬁrms desire to “escape” weak institutions in their home country, and
engage with more robust ones, in order to establish a credible risk–return trade off and potentially seek lower cost sources of
ﬁnance (Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2014). It is also consistent with the analysis by Doidge et al. (2007) who argue that
country level protection of investors is crucial to ambitious ﬁrms, and that of Coffee (2002) who argues that by cross-listing in2 Real options theory highlights the strategic aspects of taking managerial decisions under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996).
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(pp. 1757). Much less discussed in the literature are the longer term beneﬁts of bonding such as amelioration of liability of for-
eignness (LOF) (Zaheer, 1995). Subsequently, this facilitates deeper or greater internationalisation, including strategic partnerships
with and technology transfer from ﬁrms in relatively developed institutional settings, as trust between the partners is facilitated
by bonding.
Overall, therefore, the literature has moved primarily in three different directions. First, and most commonly, it has focussed on
the impact of cross-listing, in particular on ﬁrm value and on the cost of capital of cross-listed ﬁrms. The second strand of the
literature is about the importance of the signalling effect of cross-listing, focussing on the corporate governance quality of the
cross-listed ﬁrms. Third, there has been an attempt to explore the implications of cross-listing for the ability of ﬁrms to embed
themselves in the better institutional environment of the countries where they decide to cross-list. It is evident from this litera-
ture that cross-listing has strong strategic elements, and can enable a ﬁrm's management to use it to create value for a ﬁrm both
in the short run, by reducing its cost of capital, and also in the long run, by giving it greater legitimacy to investors who are con-
cerned about corporate governance quality and (potential) stakeholders in other (generally better) institutional contexts. This is a
similar argument to the one made by Siegel (2009) in the analysis of strategic alliances by Mexican ﬁrms with US ﬁrms. Building
on earlier literature – see, for example, Siegel (2005) – this line of argument is that bonding needs to be considered in a wider
context, with the need for a greater understanding between a ﬁrm's bonding strategy, and its governance. In turn this widens
the discussion from the literature which merely focuses on ﬁnancial performance, and seeks to examine the importance of bond-
ing using a wider set of dimensions. However, an integrated theory about this strategic aspect of cross-listing is missing in the
literature and, as we have discussed in the previous section, contributing towards the development of a uniﬁed framework for
discussion of cross-listing from a strategic standpoint is perhaps the most important contribution of this paper.
3. Hypotheses development
An emerging market ﬁrm's decision about cross-listing is shaped by the trade-off between the cost of revealing more about the
ﬁrm to external agents and the signalling beneﬁts associated with such exposure. The costs may be greater for ﬁrms that are in-
formationally opaque, but the beneﬁts can be high if they are able to signal their governance quality. Once the decision to become
(and remain) cross-listed is made, there are some immediate and visible beneﬁts in the form of greater access to (perhaps
cheaper) capital from deeper capital markets. There are also potential gains from bonding with a better institutional context,Fig. 1. Opportunities and beneﬁts of cross-listing.
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ﬁrms. Unsurprisingly, the beneﬁts of bonding might be less for emerging market ﬁrms that already have somewhat strong
institutions.
A uniﬁed framework about cross-listing should, in other words, be able to explain the choice to become (and remain) cross-
listed on the basis of anticipated net beneﬁts, and be able to demonstrate ex post beneﬁts associated with cross-listing. Since ben-
eﬁts of cross-listing may be anticipated but costs incurred to facilitate cross-listing are immediate, the theory should also take into
account the ability of ﬁrms to bear this ex ante cost. Also, the decision to cross-list is strategic and hence a unifying discussion
about cross-listing should proceed from a strategic perspective. We seek to develop such an approach using the real options
framework (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Klingebiel and Adner, 2015) as the centre piece for this strategy-based discussion. We pro-
pose that the real options analysis of cross-listing, within the context of IB, ties together the different strands of the literature in
order to take account of the various strategic decisions involved in cross-listing. Our framework is highlighted in Fig. 1.
Following Bowman and Hurry (1993), the interpretation of Fig. 1 is as follows. Firms strategize about internationalisation
which is dependent on both the ability and the motivation to internationalise. As we argue later in the paper, motivation depends
on the ﬁrm's informational opacity and, correspondingly, corporate governance quality. Its ability to internationalise depends, at
least in part, on ﬁrm speciﬁc advantages (FSAs) such as ﬁnancial resources (Bhaumik et al., 2010). The cross-listing literature
discussed above highlights the fact that cross-listing itself can be achieved with little commitment of resources by the ﬁrm. How-
ever, as we discuss later in the paper, for some ﬁrms the ex-ante cost of the requisite restructuring of governance can be high or
even prohibitive. Once the ﬁrm is cross-listed, it can beneﬁt directly through lower cost of (or greater access to) capital (Stulz,
1999), and indirectly by bonding with a developed institutional context (Bell et al., 2012; Peng and Su, 2014). Greater access
to lower cost of capital, in turn, increases the ability of a ﬁrm to internationalise.
In the longer run, the cross-listed ﬁrm can deepen its internationalisation by leveraging its bonding, i.e., exercise the so-called
“call” option. Building on Siegel (2009), bonding is expected to give a cross-listed ﬁrm greater legitimacy with respect to its con-
gruence with corporate governance and other institutions in another (generally, more developed) context, and thereby ease its
LOF. However, should the beneﬁts of bonding prove to be insigniﬁcant or smaller than bonding effects of alternative mechanisms
such as strategic alliances (Siegel, 2005, 2009),3 the ﬁrm may choose to not deepen its exposure to the host country further but
continue to enjoy beneﬁts such as lower cost of capital. Finally, if prospects of further internationalisation are weak and the gains
from lower cost of capital are not signiﬁcant relative to the cost of being transparent then it can exercise the “put” option and
delist from the overseas capital market.
Cross-listing is, in the words of Bowman and Hurry (1993), the “real option”. It may also be considered, as argued by Banalieva
and Robertson (2010), a distinct form of entry reﬂecting increasing commitment (but short of a full FDI-based commitment) to
the host country, and local partners. Firms from weak institutional environments that are uncertain about their ability to interna-
tionalise through FDI use this relatively low cost option (with the caveat discussed above) to gain access to global capital markets
and to bond with stronger institutional contexts, in anticipation of (albeit with no obligation to) greater internationalisation. Fig. 1
therefore illustrates the full characterisation of a strategy associated with internationalisation, with cross-listing as an intermediate
step. It not only pulls together the literatures related to signalling, cost of capital and bonding, but also explicates the corporate
governance aspect of cross-listing by way of the relationship between informational opacity of a ﬁrm and its motivation to
cross-list.
We ﬁrst explore the issue of motivation of ﬁrms to cross-list. As such, cross-listing requires ﬁrms to be more transparent and
demonstrate good corporate governance and the cost of (re-)organising themselves in this manner is likely to be high for ﬁrms
that are opaque and not well governed. The cost is likely to be fairly high for informationally opaque ﬁrms with weak governance
structures that are ubiquitous in emerging market economies (Khanna and Palepu, 2000b; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Gibson,
2003). This informational opacity is often manifested in lack of clarity about the ownership structures of these ﬁrms (Bebchuk
et al., 2000), and is believed to result in expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders (Claessens et al.,
1999). The IB literature has discussed the implications of such opacity for internationalisation through ﬁnancial markets and out-
ward FDI (Bhaumik and Drifﬁeld, 2011; Chung et al., 2015).
However, precisely because ﬁrms that are informationally opaque are known to have high agency costs, such that they are
more likely than other ﬁrms to be associated with adverse selection, cross-listing and the associated signals can beneﬁt these
ﬁrms more than others. In the emerging market context, for example, where ownership concentration is ubiquitous (Bhaumik
and Selarka, 2012, and references therein), business groups and ﬁrms afﬁliated to them are considered to be particularly opaque
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000b; Claessens and Fan, 2002).4 In part, this is on account of their ability to control ﬁrms through a maze
of cross-holding of shares and cross-membership of company boards (Bebchuk et al., 2000), and, in part, this is on account of their
ability to move assets and earnings across ﬁrms using mechanisms such as tunnelling (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). Firms from
emerging market economies, where the institutional weaknesses at the country-level, especially with respect to investor3 Using a set of Mexican ﬁrms, Siegel (2005) explores the use of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) as a bonding mechanism, but concludes that these are not as
effective as other forms, for example strategic alliances (Siegel, 2009).
4 The term “Business Group” has particular connotations in terms of emergingmarket economies, relating not just to cross holdings, but to use of internal capital and
labour markets. This is distinct from the use of the termwithin the context of the global value chains literature; see for example Altomonte and Rungi (2013) who use
the term in the context of hierarchies between parents and afﬁliates.
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incentive to cross-list. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a. Informational opacity of a ﬁrm is positively related to the likelihood of its cross-listing.
However, an opaque ﬁrm has other ways to signal its quality, in particular, because governance quality (managers and
entrenched controlling shareholders working in the interests of the ﬁrm rather than for their own private beneﬁts) and ﬁrm ca-
pabilities/performance are generally positively correlated (Klapper and Love, 2004, Cuervo-Cazzura and Dau, 2009). Hence, ﬁrms
with higher proﬁtability and cash ﬂow have less need to signal good governance through cross listing, as they are able to signal
performance directly. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1b. The motivation for cross listing in the presence of informational opacity is weaker when a ﬁrm is able to signal
good governance quality through its ﬁnancial capacity.
Financial capacity not only permits informationally opaqueﬁrms to signal their governance quality, they directly affect aﬁrm's ability
to cross-list. As noted by Bhaumik et al. (2010) and references therein, ﬁrms in weak institutional settings often develop governance
structures andmechanisms for dispute settlement that are informal, often aligned through family relationships and dominant entrepre-
neurs. Cross-listing in developed countries however requires that these ﬁrms have established internal structures to process strategic
decisions transparently, and the capacity to deal with strategic, legal and regulatory issues across international boundaries. For many
of these ﬁrms, the associated cost of restructuring may be high or even prohibitive; see, for example, a discussion about restructuring
needs of family ﬁrms in Bhaumik and Dimova (2014). Speciﬁcally, as demonstrated by Bhaumik et al. (2010), emerging market ﬁrms
that are large and proﬁtable, with large cash ﬂows, have greater capability to internationalise, perhaps because they have greater ability
to bear any cost of reorganisation and restructuring that is necessary to be attractive to investors in a different (generally better)
institutional context. This is consistent with ﬁndings that suggest that a ﬁrm's resources have an impact on their cross-listing (Pagano
et al., 2002; Bailey et al., 2006). This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. There is a positive relationship between a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial capacity and its likelihood of cross-listing.
We now turn to the directly observable (or tangible) beneﬁts from cross-listing that result from signalling. To recapitulate, signal-
ling theory suggests that such signalling can lead to “separating equilibria” whereby investors are able to distinguish between well
governed and poorly governed ﬁrms. Once a ﬁrm is able to signal its governance quality in some way – through cross-listing, for ex-
ample – they are rewarded by the capitalmarket. Doidge et al. (2007), for example, argue that controlling shareholders of cross-listed
ﬁrms have lower incentive to consume private beneﬁts associated with their position. Evidence from the corporate governance liter-
ature supports the narrative about the relationship between signalling (better) governance quality and cost of capital (see Healy and
Palepu, 2001). The signalling beneﬁts of cross-listing were discussed early by Stulz (1999). The subsequent literature on information
beneﬁts of cross-listing – e.g., Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), Bailey et al. (2006), and Sami and Zhou (2008) – is also consistent with
this signalling–cost of capital relationship, even though it suggests that the impact of cross-listing on the cost of capital may differ by
choice of overseas exchange (Hail and Leuz, 2009). This signalling effect is reinforced by ex post actualmonitoring inmore reliable (or
multiple) regulatory jurisdictions. These advantages are supplemented by the portfolio effect, whereby the lower expected risk-
adjusted returns of global investors reduce the cost of capital of these cross-listed ﬁrms.
Our main proposition is that cross listing improves a ﬁrm's ability to access external capital, and reduces its cost of capital. In turn,
the beneﬁcial signalling effect is higher for ex ante informationally opaque ﬁrms. Cross listing communicates the ﬁrm's willingness to
submit itself to scrutiny, and therefore signals superior governance quality compared with its peers. One canmake similar arguments
concerning the ability of an emerging market ﬁrm to attract foreign investment. We argue therefore however that the beneﬁcial ef-
fects of cross listing and attracting foreign investment are multiplicative. Firstly, the signalling effect associated with both events is
greater, in that they both demonstrate the ability to overcome the liability of foreignness in international capital markets. Secondly,
incumbent foreign ownershipmay further ameliorate ﬁnancial constraints by attractingmore overseas investors who arewary about
investing within the domestic domain of the cross-listed ﬁrm but are more willing to invest in it within the context of cross-listing
that have stronger (or at least more familiar) institutions. Further, if foreign ownership is perceived to be correlatedwith phenomena
such as technology transfer (Drifﬁeld et al., 2014) there are positive implications for future performance that can also lead to even
greater access to capital from overseas shareholders. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a. Cross-listed ﬁrms will experience reduced ﬁnancial constraints compared with their non-cross-listed counterparts.
Hypothesis 3b. The positive relationship between cross-listing and reduction in ﬁnancial constraints will be stronger for informa-
tionally opaque ﬁrms.
Hypothesis 3c. The positive relationship between cross-listing and reduction in ﬁnancial constraints will be stronger for ﬁrms
with foreign ownership.
Our ﬁnal hypothesis concerns the more intangible beneﬁts from cross-listing, namely, bonding. Bonding with a stronger over-
seas institutional context, can confer on the ﬁrm institutional legitimacy. This, in turn, can result in greater access to capital in the
short run, and carries with it beneﬁts such as amelioration of LOF and access to advanced technology in the longer run. The longer
run advantages of bonding are difﬁcult to model empirically because there is little a priori theory about how long it takes for
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associated with LOF-reducing institutional legitimacy is likely to be less for ﬁrms for which there is ex ante similarity between
institutional environments of home country and country of cross-listing.
Implicit in the bonding discussion is the argument that these gains are likely to be signiﬁcant only if the institutional distance
between the home country of the ﬁrm and the country of cross-listing is signiﬁcant. For example, Hail and Leuz's (2009) conclu-
sion that (largely) European ﬁrms gain signiﬁcantly by cross-listing at US exchanges but do not gain commensurately at the
London exchange suggests that perhaps institutional distance matters. In a similar vein, Herrmann et al. (2015) argue that the
beneﬁts of cross-listing in the US are not uniform across countries, but dependent on the perceived improvement in governance
quality from investing in the US. Alternatively, if the home country corporate governance institutions (e.g., investor protection) are
good, the extent of “bonding” beneﬁt resulting from cross-listing can be expected to be low. Reese and Weisbach (2002), for
example, argue that the increase in equity offerings following a cross-listing is larger for ﬁrms whose country of origin is less
effective in protecting minority shareholders' interests. We, therefore, have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Firms from home countries with good institutional quality will beneﬁt less from cross-listing's impact on access to
capital than those from countries with poor institutional quality.4. Data
It is evident from the discussion in Section 3 that the analysis requires a mix of ﬁrms that are cross-listed and those that are
not, and that ﬁrm level characteristics (e.g., informational opacity and proﬁtability) would have to be matched with country level
indicators of institutional quality, allowing for a degree of variation at the country level as well as the ﬁrm level. We, therefore,
focus on four emerging market economies – Poland, Mexico, Indonesia and South Africa – that are large and important members
of the emerging market club, and yet are different from China and India that are much discussed and whose ﬁrms enjoy special
beneﬁts because of factors such as their size.
Table 1 shows the deﬁnitions of all ﬁrm- and country-level indicators used in our analysis. Information on cross-listing and
other key ﬁrm-level variables come from the commercially available dataset ORBIS. This dataset provides detailed information
on company proﬁles, including proﬁt and loss accounts, balance sheets and other ﬁnancials. These are all converted into US dollar
equivalents for the sake of comparability across countries and deﬂated using GDP deﬂators from the World Bank's World
Development indicators to take account of inﬂation. Annual country-level indices come from the World Bank's World Develop-
ment Indicators and the World Bank ‘Doing Business’ database.Table 1
Variable deﬁnition.
Variable name Variable description
Dependent variables
Cross-listing This is a dummy variable equalling 1 if an emerging market ﬁrm lists stock in at least one foreign stock market outside its home
market and zero if it does not.
Investment to capital
ratio
A ﬁrm's ratio of annual investment to its capital stock, where capital is deﬁned as the stock of ﬁxed assets and investment is deﬁned as
the annual change in the ﬁxed assets.
Independent variables
Business group This is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to a business group and zero if it does not.
ROA A ﬁrm's return on assets drawn from the balance sheet account.
CFTA A ﬁrm's annual level of cash ﬂow over total assets
Foreign ownership This is a dummy equalling 1 if the share of foreign ownership is at least 50% in the emerging market ﬁrm and zero if it is not.
Investor protection This is an index from the World Bank's Doing Business database. It shows, for each country, the strength of investor protection as the
average of the extent of disclosure index (i.e. transparency of transactions), the extent of director liability index (i.e. liability for
self-dealing) and the ease of shareholder suits index (i.e. shareholders' ability to sue ofﬁcers and directors for misconduct). The index
ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating more investor protection. For more details about the methodology used for this
indicator, visit http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodologysurveys/.
Tobin's q Ratio of a ﬁrm's market value to book value
Sales to capital ratio Ratio of sales to capital
Control variables
Firm size The natural logarithm of total number of full time employees of the ﬁrm.
Firm age The age of a ﬁrm calculated since year of when the company has been incorporated.
LTDTA A ﬁrm's annual level of long term debt over total assets
IATA All intangible assets over total assets. Intangible assets include formation expenses, research expenses, goodwill, development
expenses and all other expenses with a long term effect. Total assets are deﬁned as ﬁxed assets plus current ﬁxed assets. Both items
are drawn from the balance sheet account.
Assets A ﬁrm's annual level of total assets
Cash ﬂow A ﬁrm's annual level of cash ﬂow
Market cap to GDP A country's annual market capitalisation of listed ﬁrms to GDP (Source: World Bank's World Development Indicators)
Table 2
Distribution of emerging market ﬁrms across countries and cross-listings, 2006–2013.
Country Investor protection Market cap of
listed ﬁrms to GDP
Ease of accessing
local equity marketa
Total number of ﬁrms Number of
ﬁrms that
cross-list
Number of ﬁrms
that cross-list in
major exchangesb
Number of ﬁrms that
cross-list in other
developed market
exchangesc
Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.)
Indonesia 5.75 (0.31) 40.23 (11.11) 4.93 (0.66) 219 81 49 79
Mexico 5.71 (0.76) 36.53 (7.62) 3.79 (0.63) 33 17 16 15
Poland 5.96 (0.11) 34.55 (10.69) 4.10 (0.51) 235 13 12 9
South Africa 8.00 (0.00) 208.10 (62.30) 5.46 (0.51) 115 80 39 76
Total 602 191 116 179
Note:
a This is an index measuring ease of accessing a local equity market, taken from the Global Competitiveness Report, prepared by World Economic Forum (WEF).
b Major exchanges are New York, London, Frankfurt, Zurich, Hong Kong and Singapore.
c Other developed markets are deﬁned as all other exchanges in developed countries.
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ﬁrms that do not. This induces the classic “self-selection” problem that must be controlled for in the analysis. The literature ad-
vocates several solutions to this problem. More sophisticated techniques (currently employed in the corporate ﬁnance literature)
involve the use of matching techniques to overcome the self-selection problem (Kai and Prabhala, 2007). Speciﬁcally, we use the
Mahalanobis matching technique. Conceptually, this involves identifying a “treatment” group – in this case, emerging market
ﬁrms that have cross-listed – and matching those with untreated ﬁrms that are similar to the treated ﬁrms, based on a given
set of criteria as speciﬁed in the “distance function”. We use the following dimensions to match emerging market ﬁrms with
cross-listing to their non-cross-listed emerging market counterparts: employment (to proxy ﬁrm size), ﬁrm age, 2-digit industry
and home country of the emerging market ﬁrms. It is important to note that “matching” does not mean that the treated and non-
treated ﬁrms will be (nearly) identical to each other, especially if the matching is done along multiple dimensions. They merely lie
within some pre-determined distance of each other, i.e., they are roughly similar along some combination of those dimensions.
After accounting formissing data for relevant variables, we have an unbalanced panel of 602 emergingmarket ﬁrms from Indonesia,
Poland, Mexico and South Africa, covering the time period of 2006–2013; of these, 191 are cross-listed at overseas exchanges. Table 2
shows the distribution of ﬁrms across the four countries, and the extent of capital market development and investor protection in the
aforementioned four countries. Table 3 shows the distribution of emerging market ﬁrms by their industry afﬁliation.5
5. Research methodology
5.1. Drivers of cross-listing
Our empirical exercise on the basis of Fig. 1 means that for Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 2 we effectively discuss the determinants of
cross-listing. Some of these determinants capture the motivation of a ﬁrm (especially those from emerging market economies) to
internationalise (and thereby hold a real option with respect to greater internationalisation in the future). Some others capture
the ability of the ﬁrm to internationalise and indeed bear any cost associated with cross-listing itself. We have argued that mo-
tivation depends on the informational opacity of ﬁrms and mitigating factors such as ﬁrm performance and foreign ownership.
In keeping with similar analyses in the cross-listing literature discussed above, we start with a probit model to explain the
probability of a ﬁrm obtaining a cross listing:5 In kPr CLð Þit ¼ β0 þ β1 Business Groupi;t−1 þ β2 Business Group ROAð Þi;t−1
þβ3 Business Group CFTAð Þi;t−1 þ β4 ROAi;t−1 þ β5 CFTAi;t−1
þβ6 Firm sizei;t−1 þ β7 Firm agei;t−1 þ β8 LTDTAi;t−1 þ β9 IATAi;t−1þ
β10 Foreign Ownershipi;t−1 þ eit
ð1Þwhere Pr(CL) is the probability of being cross-listed in a given year, Business Group is a dummy variable where the ﬁrm has mem-
bership of informationally opaque business groups, offering a direct test to Hypothesis 1a. We have two measures to proxy for a
ﬁrm's ﬁnancial capacity: ROA or return on assets as a measure of proﬁtability, and CFTA as the ratio of cash ﬂow to total assets.
Taken together, these variables capture variation in the ﬁnancial capacity of ﬁrms and offer a test of Hypothesis 2. Testing of
Hypothesis 1b is facilitated by the interaction between the business group dummy and the two aforementioned ﬁnancial mea-
sures. A number of stylised control variables are also used in the ﬁrm level analysis, including IATA which is the ratio of intangible
to total assets and reﬂects FSAs (Braunerhjelm, 1996; Bhaumik et al., 2010); Foreign ownership which is a dummy equalling 1
when the share of foreign ownership is at least 50% in the ﬁrm and zero otherwise; a ﬁrm's age and size; and leverage
(LTDTA). Finally, eit is the iid error term. We also control for industry, country and year effects using dummy control variables.eeping with much of the literature in this area, ﬁnancial institutions and utility companies are omitted from the sample.
Table 3
Industry distribution of emerging market ﬁrms across countries and cross-listings.
Sector Indonesia Mexico Poland South Africa
Non cross-listing
ﬁrms
Cross-listing
ﬁrms
Non cross-listing
ﬁrms
Cross-listing
ﬁrms
Non cross-listing
ﬁrms
Cross-listing
ﬁrms
Non cross-listing
ﬁrms
Cross-listing
ﬁrms
Agriculture 2 7 0 0 1 0 2 2
Mining 6 13 0 2 1 1 2 6
Manufacturing 79 28 8 5 72 5 11 36
Construction 4 1 0 2 24 1 0 5
Wholesale/Retail 8 9 1 5 49 2 4 11
Transportation 12 4 0 0 7 0 1 5
Accommodation 6 1 1 1 3 0 1 1
Information
Technology
9 8 3 1 26 3 8 6
Real Estate 8 6 0 0 5 1 0 1
Professional
Services
2 2 1 0 23 0 2 0
Administrative
Services
2 1 1 0 5 0 2 5
Educational
Services
0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Health Services 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1
Arts sector 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 1
Total 138 81 16 17 222 13 35 80
272 Y. Temouri et al. / Journal of International Management 22 (2016) 265–279The explanatory variables are lagged by one period to address potential endogeneity problems. Note also, with Pr(CL) as the
dependent variable in the analysis, we are not discussing the single act or decision to cross-list but rather the continual strategic
decision to remain cross-listed during a given year, or not. We estimate the probit model using pooled data and report the mar-
ginal effects.
Given that we are using multiple measures of a ﬁrm's ability to internationalise and, correspondingly, multiple measures of
factors that can mitigate the relationship between the informational opacity of a ﬁrm and the likelihood of remaining cross-
listed in a given year, it is possible that not all the regression coefﬁcients associated with Hypotheses 1b and 2 will be statistically
signiﬁcant. Among the control variables, IATA is expected to have a positive impact on any form of internationalisation. However,
since emerging market ﬁrms often do not have signiﬁcant FSAs and given that cross-listing may itself be a way to enhance FSA ex
post through strategic partnerships and technology transfer, statistical signiﬁcance of this variable is not guaranteed. Given that
foreign investment in an emerging market company (and correspondingly foreign ownership of shares) enhances their ability
to internationalise (Khanna and Palepu, 2000a; Bhaumik et al., 2010), we expect this control variable to have a positive impact
on the likelihood of cross-listing as well. Firm size can be expected to have a positive impact on the likelihood of being cross-
listed in a given year as well — larger ﬁrms are more likely to internationalise, but the impact of ﬁrm age on this likelihood is
not as clear. On the one hand, older ﬁrms have signiﬁcant operational experience but, on the other hand, they may be too
optimised for one institutional and regulatory context to venture into a new context. We also include leverage as a control,
though the impact of leverage on the likelihood of cross-listing is also ambiguous. While leverage is known to affect ﬁrm behav-
iour and is therefore a stylized control variable in ﬁrm-level analysis, there is little theory about the precise way in which it can
affect the likelihood of cross-listing.5.2. Gains from cross listing
We now proceed to Hypotheses 3a–3c and 4; the former are about the effects of signalling while the latter is about bonding. In
the IB literature much of the discussion about the potential beneﬁts of cross-listing concerns greater access to capital and lower
cost of capital for cross-listed ﬁrms. In other words, where ﬁrms experience ﬁnancial constraints on account of frictions that in-
hibit unfettered access to the capital market, cross-listing can help ameliorate the extent of ﬁnancial constraints experienced by a
ﬁrm. We, therefore, draw on the discussion about ﬁnancial constraints of ﬁrms to empirically examine Hypotheses 3a–3c and 4.
The impact of signalling is easy to comprehend: cross-listing should reduce a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial constraints and ﬁrms with certain
characteristics would beneﬁt more than others. The operationalisation of Hypothesis 4, about bonding, requires further explana-
tion. Recapitulate that while most of the beneﬁts of bonding are experienced in the long run, the discussion of which lies outside
the scope of this paper, we focus on a speciﬁc aspect of bonding, namely, beneﬁts from bonding are lower if the home country of
the cross-listed ﬁrms have relatively strong institutions (and hence are similar to those in the country of cross-listing). This ben-
eﬁt of bonding should be reﬂected in the short term beneﬁts of cross-listing, speciﬁcally, with respect to access to capital. As such,
if the home country of the cross-listed ﬁrm has strong institutional quality, then its beneﬁts from bonding (i.e., access to capital)
will be less. Hence, we test Hypotheses 3a–3c and 4 using the same empirical framework, that of a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial constraint;
with Hypotheses 3a–3c linked to variables that capture a ﬁrm's informational opacity and Hypothesis 4 linked to the institutional
quality of the home countries of the cross-listed ﬁrms.
273Y. Temouri et al. / Journal of International Management 22 (2016) 265–279The ﬁnance literature on ﬁnancial constraints of ﬁrms is largely based on the seminal work of Fazzari et al. (1988). One of the
challenges of discussing a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial constraints is that it implies an excess demand for capital (at least, capital that is priced
at a level that is acceptable to a ﬁrm) and yet we only observe the actual amount of capital at a ﬁrm's disposal, not the ﬁrm's
capital needs relative to the amount to which it has access. In the literature on ﬁnancial constraints, this problem is ﬁnessed as
follows: a ﬁrm's investment decisions should ideally depend on factors such as its current sales and, more importantly, Tobin's
q which is a stylised measure of a ﬁrm's future prospects. If the ﬁrm has unfettered access to the capital market then this invest-
ment level should be independent of its internal ﬁnancial resources. However, if the ﬁrm experiences ﬁnancial constraints – it is
argued – this investment level would also depend on its internal ﬁnancial resources and in the literature the stylised measure of
internal ﬁnancial resources is its cash ﬂows. As such, the greater the cash ﬂow sensitivity of a ﬁrm's investment, the greater is its
ﬁnancial constraints.
The advantage of this approach is its simplicity; it involves the estimation of simple cross-section or panel ﬁxed effects regression
models whereby the regression speciﬁcation is given by:6 In o
thereforln
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¼ δ0 þ δ1 lnQi;t þ δ2 ln
SALEi;t
Ki;t−1
 !
þ δ3 ln
SALEi;t−1
Ki;t−2
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þ δ4CF þΦ0Zi;t−1 þ θt þ μ i þ eit ð2Þwhere I is investment (i.e., annual change in capital stock), K is capital stock (i.e., ﬁxed assets) of the ﬁrm, ln Q is log of Tobin's q, S
is sales, CF is cash ﬂow, Z is a vector of other ﬁrm characteristics such as ﬁrm size and ﬁrm age, θ and μ are time and ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects, and e is the iid error term. The focus then is on the coefﬁcient of the cash ﬂow variable, δ4. However, as with any cross-
section or panel data regression model, estimates of Eq. (2) give us the cash ﬂow sensitivity of the average ﬁrm, i.e., a view about
the ﬁnancial constraint of the average ﬁrm, which is not particularly satisfactory.
In recent extensions of the Fazzari et al. (1988) methodology, therefore, Wang (2003) and Bhaumik et al. (2012) have pro-
posed an alternative empirical approach which involves ﬁrst estimating ﬁrm-speciﬁc measures of ﬁnancial constraints and subse-
quently, regressing this measure of ﬁnancial constraints on factors that can enhance or reduce it. The conceptual basis of their
argument is as follows: if a ﬁrm operates in a perfect capital market and has unfettered access to capital then, as mentioned
above, it's investment would depend only on factors such as Tobin's q and sales levels. However, de facto, on account of factors
such as informational asymmetry between investors and ﬁrms, the aforementioned ﬁrm does not operate in perfect capital mar-
ket and hence its actual level of investment is less than this optimal level. Let us call the gap between the optimal and actual level
of investment “inefﬁciency”.6 Hypotheses 3a–3c and 4 can be addressed within this setting, once this ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of in-
efﬁciency is estimated. If cross-listing reduces ﬁnancial constraints, it should also reduce this inefﬁciency, implicitly bringing the
ﬁrm's observed actual investment to its unobserved optimal investment level. Similarly, if beneﬁts of bonding are less for ﬁrms
from countries with high institutional quality, this inefﬁciency and home country institutional quality of ﬁrms should be positively
correlated.
The challenge, of course, is to estimate this inefﬁciency level and Wang (2003) and Bhaumik et al. (2012) propose a solution
involving the use of stochastic frontier models (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). This approach involves estimating the equation that
estimates the optimum level of investment that is associated with ﬁrm i's Tobin's q and sales levels:ln
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þ θt þ μ i þ eit ð3Þand estimating the aforementioned inefﬁciency (u) as deviation of observed investment from this optimum:Iit
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 !SF
−u Zt ;wtð Þ: ð4ÞThereafter, this inefﬁciency is regressed on the variables in which we are interested.
In our case, this second regression equation is given by:uit ¼ π0 þ π1CLi;t−1 þ π2 CL Business groupð Þi;t−1 þ π3 CL Foreign ownershipð Þi;t−1 þ π4 CL Investor protectionð Þi;t−1
þπ5 Firm agei;t−1 þ π5 Assetsi;t−1 þ π5 Cash flowi;t−1 þ π5 Market cap to GDPi;t−1
ð5Þwhere u is the measure of a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial constraints, CL is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a ﬁrm is cross-listed, such
that we expect the coefﬁcient to be negative in line with Hypothesis 3a, Business group is the familiar binary indicator of a ﬁrm's
informational opacity, which when interacted with cross-listing we expect to have a negative effect in line with Hypothesis 3b.
Foreign ownership is also a binary indicator of foreign shareholding in a ﬁrm, which when interacted with cross-listing provides
a direct test of Hypothesis 3c. Investor protection is a measure of the quality of the home institutions of a ﬁrm — we speciﬁcally
choose investor protection that is most relevant in the context of stock market listing. Our control variables are ﬁrm age, totalur framework, this inefﬁciency can be zero at best, when a ﬁrm does not experience any capital market friction, or positive. The distribution of this inefﬁciency,
e, is half-normal.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.
Variable Mean Std. dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) ROA 3.84 14.13 1
(2) Firm size 4420.38 14268.56 0.08⁎⁎⁎ 1
(3) Firm age 22.51 23.55 0.11⁎⁎⁎ 0.18⁎⁎⁎ 1
(4) Intangible to total assets 0.05 0.12 0.09⁎⁎⁎ 0.06⁎⁎⁎ −0.06⁎⁎⁎ 1
(5) Cash ﬂow to total assets 0.11 0.13 0.08⁎⁎⁎ 0.01 0.00 −0.03⁎⁎ 1
(6) Long term debt 0.12 0.21 −0.10⁎⁎⁎ 0.04⁎⁎⁎ −0.06⁎⁎⁎ −0.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.10⁎⁎⁎ 1
(7) Tobin's q 1.12 1.25 0.25⁎⁎⁎ 0.09⁎⁎⁎ 0.07⁎⁎⁎ 0.02 0.02 0.11⁎⁎⁎ 1
(8) Sales to capital 1.13 1.00 0.10⁎⁎⁎ 0.00 0.06⁎⁎⁎ 0.01 −0.03⁎ −0.15⁎⁎⁎ 0.07⁎⁎⁎ 1
(9) Cross-listing 0.33 0.47 0.16⁎⁎⁎ 0.33⁎⁎⁎ 0.22⁎⁎⁎ 0.02 0.03⁎⁎ 0.09⁎⁎⁎ 0.16⁎⁎⁎ −0.06⁎⁎⁎ 1
(10) Investor protection 6.21 0.82 0.11⁎⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎⁎ 0.24⁎⁎⁎ 0.17⁎⁎⁎ 0.06⁎⁎⁎ 0.01 0.05⁎⁎⁎ −0.01 0.30⁎⁎⁎ 1
(11) Business Group 0.13 0.34 0.02 0.02 0.06⁎⁎⁎ −0.03⁎⁎ −0.02 −0.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.05⁎⁎⁎ 0.00 0.02⁎ 0.08⁎⁎⁎ 1
(12) Foreign ownership dummy 0.10 0.30 0.01 −0.04⁎⁎ −0.04⁎⁎⁎ −0.06⁎⁎⁎ 0.00 −0.01 −0.05⁎⁎⁎ −0.05⁎⁎⁎ 0.00 −0.10⁎⁎⁎ −0.10⁎⁎⁎ 1
(13) Market-cap-to-GDP 62.34 63.77 0.14⁎⁎⁎ 0.24⁎⁎⁎ 0.22⁎⁎⁎ 0.12⁎⁎⁎ 0.06⁎⁎⁎ 0.03⁎ 0.11⁎⁎⁎ −0.01 0.33⁎⁎⁎ 0.88⁎⁎⁎ −0.08⁎⁎⁎ −0.08⁎⁎⁎ 1
Note: The mean and standard deviation is shown for the matched sample of ﬁrms.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at 10 level.
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275Y. Temouri et al. / Journal of International Management 22 (2016) 265–279assets of a ﬁrm and cash ﬂow; these are stylised in the literature (see Bhaumik et al., 2012). We have additionally controlled for
the state of capital market development in the home country of the ﬁrms, using the stylized measure of the ratio of market
capitalisation in the home country to its GDP, because it has implications for a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial constraints.
Note that since Eq. (5) explains inefﬁciency; the greater the deviation of a ﬁrm's investment from the optimum, i.e., the greater
the ﬁnancial constraints of the ﬁrms, the greater is the inefﬁciency. In other words, a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial constraints are reduced if
inefﬁciency is lower, i.e., if an estimated regression coefﬁcient is negative. By the same token, a positive regression coefﬁcient
indicates that inefﬁciency, and hence ﬁnancial constraint, is increasing.
5.3. Summary statistics and correlation
The summary statistics and the correlation matrix are reported in Table 4. It can be seen that multicollinearity is not a problem
for our set of independent variables for both the probit and stochastic frontier models. Most of the correlations between
explanatory variables are weak, and VIF calculations are all below 2.5 and thus do not suggest multicollinearity problems.
6. Results
The ﬁrst stage of our analysis explores the ﬁrm level characteristics associated with cross-listing, using the matching algorithm
to allow for the selection process as described in the previous section. Table 5 presents the estimations of the probit analysis
across four models. Model 1 tests Hypothesis 1a, which captures the impact of cross-listing for a ﬁrm belonging to a business
group. Model 2 tests Hypothesis 2, which isolates the impact of ﬁrm performance, cash ﬂow and intangible to total assets on
cross-listing. Model 3 brings together the variables relevant for both Hypotheses 1a and 2 and, ﬁnally, Model 4 introduces to
the speciﬁcation the interactions between the aforementioned variables that are the basis for Hypothesis 1b.
6.1. Hypothesis 1a
Focusing ﬁrst on the motivation to cross list, the results provide strong support for the ﬁrst hypothesis, Firstly, ﬁrms that are
informationally opaque are more likely to cross list, offering support for Hypothesis 1a. The coefﬁcient on the business groupTable 5
Determinants of cross-listing.
Dependent variable = 1 for cross-listed ﬁrms; =0 otherwise Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)...........................
Hypotheses 1a (motivation to cross list)
Business Group (t − 1) 0.079** 0.072** 0.227***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.059)
Hypotheses 2 (ability to cross list)
ROA (t − 1) 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CFTA (t − 1) 0.304*** 0.302*** 0.428***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.106)
Hypotheses 1b (enhanced motivation)
ROA (t − 1) ∗ Business Group (t − 1) −0.005*
(0.003)
CFTA (t − 1) ∗ Business Group (t − 1) −1.029***
(0.301)
Control variables
Log Firm size (t − 1) 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.122***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Firm age (t − 1) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LTDTA (t − 1) 0.131*** 0.205*** 0.199*** 0.184***
(0.049) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053)
IATA (t − 1) 0.271** 0.363*** 0.372*** 0.389***
(0.136) (0.135) (0.134) (0.134)
Foreign Ownership (t − 1) −0.002***
(0.001)
Wald chi-square 803.610 892.200 900.190 873.930
Prob N chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.453 0.460 0.461 0.469
Log pseudolikelihood −828.987 −812.874 −811.013 −799.498
Industry, Year and Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2339 2316 2316 2316
Notes: coefﬁcients are marginal effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All explanatory variables are lagged one year to pre-empt potential endogeneity issues.
Monetary values are deﬂated using GDP deﬂators.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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listed in a given year than other ﬁrms, ceteris paribus.6.2. Hypothesis 2
Model 2 in Table 5 suggests that the likelihood of being cross-listed in any given year increaseswith a ﬁrm's performance/ﬁnancial
capacity (speciﬁcally, proﬁtability and cash ﬂow) that have implications for a ﬁrm's ability to bear the cost of necessary restructuring.
We, therefore, have strong support for Hypothesis 2.6.3. Hypothesis 1b
Moving on to the interactions between business groups and ﬁnancial performance (Model 4), we also have support for
Hypothesis 1b; impact of the business group dummy on the likelihood of attaining cross listing decreases with the ROA and
cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm. In other words, if ﬁrms can signal their governance quality by other means, their motivation to cross-list
declines.
Recapitulate that Hypotheses 3a–3c and 4 are examined using the stochastic frontier framework whose results are reported in
Table 6. The coefﬁcient estimates for the frontier indicate that a ﬁrm's investment (to capital ratio) increases with its future pros-
pects as captured by Tobin's q, while lagged sales (to capital ratio) have mixed impact on this investment. This is consistent with
the literature on ﬁnancial constraints that forms the basis for this empirical exercise; see Bhaumik et al. (2012). As explained
using Eqs. (3) and (4), the stochastic frontier model enables us to generate ﬁrm-speciﬁc measures of inefﬁciency that is a
proxy for a ﬁrm's ﬁnancial constraint. Hypotheses 3a–3c and 4 are related to this inefﬁciency equation (Eq. (5)). In Table 6, we
ﬁrst introduce the variables related to Hypotheses 3a–3c in the inefﬁciency equation (Model 1), and thereafter, we introduce
the variables related to Hypothesis 4 (Model 2). Finally, we add the control variables to the speciﬁcation for the inefﬁciency equa-
tion (Model 3). It is evident that the estimates are robust across these speciﬁcations.6.4. Hypotheses 3(a)–(c)
The regression coefﬁcients for the inefﬁciency equation suggest that inefﬁciency is lower for cross-listed ﬁrms, and that this
inefﬁciency decreases even further for business group afﬁliated ﬁrms and those with incumbent foreign shareholders. Lower in-
efﬁciency, of course, is associated with lower ﬁnancial constraints and indirectly, therefore, with access to cheaper and more
abundant capital. In other words, the signalling effect of cross-listing reduces ﬁnancial constraints, and this effect is stronger for
ex ante informationally opaque business group afﬁliated ﬁrms, and ﬁrms that already have foreign shareholders who can help at-
tract even more overseas investment upon cross-listing. We, therefore, have strong support for our signalling related hypotheses.Table 6
Impact of foreign listing on capital market frictions.
Frontier model
Dependent variable: investment to capital ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Log Tobin's q 0.041*** (0.009) 0.041*** (0.009) 0.041*** (0.000)
Log sales/capital[−1] −0.154*** (0.002) −0.146*** (0.012) −0.183*** (0.000)
Log sales[−1]/capital[−2] 0.059*** (0.010) 0.050*** (0.010) 0.097*** (0.000)
Inefﬁciency equation
Dependent variable: inefﬁciency generated from frontier model
Hypothesis 3
Cross-listing −0.879*** (0.051) −3.311*** (0.238) −2.894*** (0.332)
Cross-listing ∗ Business Group −1.079*** (0.102) −0.669*** (0.113) −0.540*** (0.116)
Cross-listing ∗ Foreign ownership −0.584*** (0.116) −0.505*** (0.122) −0.896*** (0.128)
Hypothesis 4
Cross-listing ∗ Investor protection 0.325*** (0.033) 0.359*** (0.049)
Control variables
Firm age −0.003** (0.001)
Log assets −0.185*** (0.017)
Cash ﬂow 1.32e−08 (3.63e−08)
Market cap to GDP −0.002*** (0.001)
Observations 3474 3232 2937
Note: following Bhaumik et al. (2012), the frontier model and the inefﬁciency equation are estimated jointly using the maximum likelihood method.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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Finally, we discuss our hypothesis about bonding. The relevant regression coefﬁcient reported in Table 6 suggests that for cross-listed
companies the beneﬁt in terms of lower ﬁnancial constraints is progressively offset with increase in the quality of investor protection
(and, by extension, institutional quality). Indeed, for an average value of 6 for investor protection for a country-year, well over half
the beneﬁcial impact of cross-listing (in terms of inefﬁciency reduction and hence lower ﬁnancial constraint) is offset. We, therefore,
have support for our bonding related hypothesis as well. However, as we have mentioned earlier, in our analysis we have abstracted
for long term advantages of bonding that are reﬂected not somuch in lower ﬁnancial constraints (and greater access to cheaper capital)
but in reduced LOF, greater scope for strategic partnerships with overseas ﬁrms, and technology transfer from developed country ﬁrms.6.6. Robustness checks
With regards to the results reported in Table 5, the pseudo R-square values associatedwith themodels exceed 0.40, which is fairly
good for this type of data and empirical analysis. The results are qualitatively (i.e., in terms of sign and statistical signiﬁcance) unaf-
fected by the introduction of new variables into the speciﬁcation, and are robust to controls for observed and unobserved ﬁrm char-
acteristics and time related factors. Likelihood ratio tests, not reported in the paper, suggest that the speciﬁcation that includes the
control variables dominate those that do not.We are particularly encouraged by the robustness of Hypotheses 1a and 1b to the inclu-
sion of LTDTA (or leverage) in the speciﬁcation because it nets out, to a large extent, the internal capital market aspect of business
groups that aids access to capital, such that the business group dummy reﬂects, as such, opacity and governance quality. We also
experimented with interactions between the business group dummy, andmeasures of FSAs, intangible assets and foreign ownership.
These however were insigniﬁcant, while the model is robust to their inclusion. They are therefore omitted.
Similarly, the results reported in Table 6 are robust to incremental expansion of the speciﬁcation for the inefﬁciency equation.
Note also that we estimate the frontier and inefﬁciency equations jointly which addresses a major inconsistency that plagues
models in which these equations are estimated in two stages (Coelli, 1995). Speciﬁcally, if the model is estimated in stages
then inefﬁciency effects are assumed to be iid while in the second stage they are assumed to be determined by ﬁrm-speciﬁc fac-
tors such that they are not iid by deﬁnition. We have followed Kumbhakar et al. (1991), and the subsequent extension of their
model to panel data by Battese and Coelli (1995), in modelling inefﬁciency (or market friction) explicitly as a function of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variables. Note further that the functional form of the frontier equation is consistent with the stylised literature on ﬁnan-
cial constraints (Wang, 2003; Bhaumik et al., 2012).7 Our model therefore is well speciﬁed from an econometric point of view and
this adds to our conﬁdence about our model estimates.7. Conclusion
This paper shows that ﬁrm-level indicators and the country-speciﬁc institutions explain why certain emerging market ﬁrms
cross-list. We demonstrate that cross-listing is beneﬁcial, particularly for emerging market ﬁrms who are located in countries
with lower levels of investor protection, and those that are perceived to be informationally opaque. Our ﬁndings contribute to
the wider IB literature, by combining insights drawn from the IB and ﬁnance literatures and applying it to four emerging
economies.
Our results contribute to the current debate on how emerging market ﬁrms can internationalise, and in particular overcome
LOF, that are particularly acute for ﬁrms from countries with weak institutions. Firstly, we argue that LOF applies in capital mar-
kets as well as in goods markets, and that cross-listing can be an important solution to this for ﬁrms from emerging markets.
Here, the signalling hypothesis dominates. In order for ﬁrms to fully exploit their FSAs in new markets, ﬁnance is required,
with both debt and equity ﬁnance being more readily available in more developed markets, and at lower cost. For such ﬁrms,
we show that FSAs are important in explaining their internationalisation and in particular in explaining their cross-listing
activities.
Secondly, our results extend this argument, and link the analysis of cross-listing to the burgeoning literature on EMNEs. Initial-
ly, our ﬁndings lend support to the recent edited volume of Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti (2014), and other recent literature on
EMNEs (Williamson, 2014, Bhaumik et al., 2015a,b), which highlight the heterogeneity that exists within emerging market ﬁrms,
particularly in terms of their ability to generate FSAs. As such, the argument expressed by Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti (2014)
that EMNEs are to a degree “escaping” the weak institutional environment in their home country, can also be applied to capital
market conditions, and cross-listing is an important tool for doing this. However, we can extend this argument to the other main
constraint faced by emerging market ﬁrms, which is access to technology. Whether it is through partnering with established
country ﬁrms, seeking investment from abroad, or seeking technology agreements with more advanced ﬁrms, bonding assures
the partner of good governance practices including the protection of intellectual property. As such, bonding can play an important
role in the long term development and internationalisation of emerging market ﬁrms.7 At this point in the estimation process, if onewere estimating productivity, therewould be a need to explore alternative functional forms to test whether returns to
scale restrictions in the “production function” were valid (Coelli, 1995). With our speciﬁcation and dependent variable this is not a concern.
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Our ﬁndings suggest a number of avenues for further research into cross-listing, and the integration of analysis of capital markets
within IB research. Firstly, whilewe have shown that the advantages of cross-listing are a combination of signalling (access to ﬁnance)
and the intangible beneﬁts associatedwith bonding, further research should consider the relative importance of cross-listing forﬁrms
seeking debt and those seeking equity, and the importance of this in facilitating internationalisation by emerging market ﬁrms.
An unanswered question however concerns the role that cross-listing might play in the internationalisation of the ﬁrm more
generally. Does cross-listing for example lead to ﬁrms engaging in higher levels of exporting or FDI as bonding potentially reduces
a ﬁrms' LOF? Equally, as we have shown that FSAs are important in explaining cross-listing, and its beneﬁts, does cross-listing
offer an additional location advantage, and in turn amplify the returns to further internationalisation through FDI?
It should also however be noted that, in contrast to some of the ﬁnance based literature above, we have focussed deliberately
on emerging market ﬁrms, rather than say a full set of ﬁrms who have chosen to cross list in a given location. This has some in-
herent advantages, in that we do not combine ﬁrms from countries with highly developed institutions and capital markets (for
example Germany or the UK) with ﬁrms from developing countries. The theory and literature discussed above would suggest
that the beneﬁts of cross listing will be greater for emerging market ﬁrms than for say UK ﬁrms, such that previous work may
have understated the average beneﬁt. However, at the same time, the limitations of focussing on emerging markets should be
recognised in terms of exploring the beneﬁts of cross listing per se.References
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